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Abstract
Inductive learning aims at finding general rules that hold true in a
database. Targeted learning seeks rules for the prediction of the value
of a variable based on the values of others, as in the case of linear or
non-parametric regression analysis. Non-targeted learning finds regu-
larities without a specific prediction goal. We model the product of
non-targeted learning as rules that state that a certain phenomenon
never happens, or that certain conditions necessitate another. For all
types of rules, there is a trade-oﬀ between the rule’s accuracy and
its simplicity. Thus rule selection can be viewed as a choice problem,
among pairs of degree of accuracy and degree of complexity. However,
one cannot in general tell what is the feasible set in the accuracy-
complexity space. Formally, we show that finding out whether a point
belongs to this set is computationally hard. In particular, in the con-
text of linear regression, finding a small set of variables that obtain
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a certain value of R2 is computationally hard. Computational com-
plexity may explain why a person is not always aware of rules that, if
asked, she would find valid. This, in turn, may explain why one can
change other people’s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing new
information.
“The process of induction is the process of assuming the sim-
plest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.”
(Wittgenstein 1922, Proposition 6.363)
1 Motivation
Ann: “Russia is a dangerous country.”
Bob: “Nonsense.”
Ann: “Don’t you think that Russia might initiate a war against a Western
country?”
Bob: “Not a chance.”
Ann: “Well, I believe it very well might.”
Bob: “Can you come up with examples of wars that erupted between two
democratic countries?”
Ann: “I guess so. Let me see... How about England and the US in 1812?”
Bob: “OK, save colonial wars.”
Ann: “Well, then, let’s see. OK, maybe you have a point. Perhaps Russia
is not so dangerous.”
Bob seems to have managed to change Ann’s views. He did it by drawing
her attention to “the democratic peace” phenomenon, sometimes attributed
to Kant.1 Observe, however, that Bob has not provided Ann with any new
1Kant (1795) wrote, “The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin (hav-
ing sprung from the pure source of the concept of law), also gives a favorable prospect for
the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the
citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution
it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious
in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.” Ob-
2
factual information. Rather, Bob has pointed out a certain regularity in the
cases that are known to both Ann and Bob. This regularity is, apparently,
new to Ann. Yet, she had had all the factual information needed to observe
it before meeting Bob. It simply did not occur to Ann to test the accuracy
of the generalization suggested to her by Bob.
Much of human knowledge (and, indeed, all of mathematics) has to do
with noticing facts and regularities that, in principle, could have been figured
out based on existing knowledge, rather than with acquiring new informa-
tion per se. Why do people fail to draw all the relevant conclusions from
the information they possess? Sometimes the reason is that certain aspects
of the observations they have simply do not occur to them. In the example
above, it is quite possible that Ann never thought of the type of regime as
an explanatory variable for the occurrence of wars. Sometimes a regularity
involves a combination of several variables. For many real life prediction
problems there are many potentially relevant variables. But the number of
combinations of these variables is much larger than the number of variables
(in fact, the latter increases in an exponential fashion as a function of the
former), making it practically impossible to think of all possible regularities
that might, once observed, prove true. A recent paper by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) on the quality of government states,
“We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguisti-
cally heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of
Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance.” One level
of diﬃculty is to come up with all the variables listed above as potential ex-
planatory variables. A second level of diﬃculty is to consider sophisticated
combinations as the one suggested in this paragraph.
In conclusion, there are many regularities that people do not notice, even
though they might find them true once these regularities are pointed out to
serve that Kant wrote in favor of the republican constitution, rather than democracy per
se. For recent documentations of this phenomenon, see Maoz and Russett (1992, 1993),
Russett (1993), and Maoz (1998).
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them. The main results of this paper attempt to explain this phenomenon
more formally. Before we present these results, however, we attempt to
convince the reader that the issue under discussion has more than anecdotal
interest.
2 Belief Formation
Economic theory does not in general deal with the question of belief forma-
tion. Economic agents are assumed to have beliefs and to act on them, and
these beliefs tend to take the form of a Bayesian prior probability. The lit-
erature oﬀers axiomatizations of this paradigm, which may be used to elicit
beliefs of agents who follow the axioms, but there is no description of a
process by which one generates such beliefs.
There are several reasons for an interest inthe process of belief formation.
Assume, first, that one takes a normative interpretation of expected utility
theory. One may be convinced by Savage’s (1954) axioms that one would like
to be an expected utility maximizer. The next step would be to determinea
utility function and a probability measure. At this step, one needsproba-
bilistic beliefs. Whereas any probability measure would do in order to be
“rational” in the sense of satisfying Savage’s axioms, one would normally
like to choose a reasonable probability measure. Thus, one is faced with the
question, what are reasonable beliefs to hold?
This question is also faced by organizations or teams, who attempt to
aggregate beliefs of various individuals. Even if each of these individualshas a
Bayesian prior, when these priors diﬀer, the group mustdecide on a reasonable
priorbased on their shared information.
There are also descriptive reasons to be interested in the process of belief
formation. First, having a theory of this process might shed light on regular-
ities in the prior probabilities that Bayesian agents entertain. One may be
able to categorize economic problems by the type of information available in
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them, and by the corresponding process by which the available information
results in probabilistic beliefs. Second, a better understanding of this process
can potentiallydelineate the scope of the Bayesian paradigm, and facilitate
speculationabout the types of beliefs that people might have when they do
not have a Bayesian prior.
The question of belief formation is beyond the scope of this paper, but
the problem we deal with here can be viewed as a particular sub-problem of
belief formation. Specifically, we ask how individual instances are generalized
into rules.This inductive process is likely to be a part of any theory of belief
formation. If the sun rises every day, we tend to believe that it would rise
tomorrow. Naturally, only a small part of our beliefs can be attributed to such
simple and clear regularities. Yet, slightly more complex and less accurate
regularities also feed the belief formation process.
Moreover, there are many circumstances in which beliefs are captured
byrules. For example, when one uses linear regression to generate predic-
tions, one may be viewed as believingin the simple rule of the regression
equation.2 Organizations often have simple rules that may be viewed as re-
flecting the organization’s beliefs. A credit card agency has to make daily
decision on approval of potential card holders, where each such decision is an
act that reflects beliefs regarding the applicants’ financial credibility.But the
agency is not free to select any probabilistic beliefs to guide its decisions. It
may berestricted by organizational feasibility to rules that can be followed
by many clerks, or by a software package. Furthermore, there are legal re-
strictions for which the agency has to be able to justify its decisions based
on simple rules. (There may also belegal restrictions on the type of variables
used in these rules.) Thus, to the extent that the agency’s strategy reflects
its beliefs, these beliefs are given by simple rules.
It follows that for some situations, the analysis of rules in this paper may
be viewed as a simplistic theory of belief formation. More generally, we tend
2Indeed, Bray and Savin (1986) suggest to model agents’ beliefs by linear regression.
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to view the analysis of rules merely as a first step in any reasonable account
of the process of belief formation. The motivating example above suggests
that even this first step is, in reality, far from trivial.
3 Outline
As argued by Wittgenstein (1922), “The process of induction is the process
of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our expe-
rience.” (Proposition 6.363).3 Thus, in performing induction, people have a
general preference, other things being equal, for rules that are as simple as
possible and as accurate as possible. Simple rules that accurately describe
the data give reason to hope that one may be able to predict future obser-
vations. Generating such rules appears to be a rather modest condition that
scientific theories are expected to satisfy. Simple and accurate rules can also
be used to transfer information succinctly from one person to another, or to
remember what seems to be the essence of a database.
One should normally expect to face a trade-oﬀ between simplicity and
accuracy. Consider the example of linear regression.4 Given a set of “predict-
ing” variables, one attempts to provide a good fit to a “predicted” variable.
A common measure of accuracy is the coeﬃcient of determination, R2. A
reasonable measure of complexity is the number of predictors one uses. As is
well known, suﬃciently increasing the number of predictors will generically
provide a perfect fit, namely, a perfectly accurate rule. But this rule will be
complex. In fact, its complexity will be equal to the number of observations
in the database, and it will be considered to have little predictive value. By
contrast, a small number of predictors may not obtain a satisfactory level of
3Simplicity was mentioned by William of Occam seven centuries earlier. But Occam’s
razor is an argument with a normative flavor, whereas here we refer to a descriptive claim
about the nature of human reasoning.
4While regression analysis is a basic tool of scientific research, it can also be viewed as
a (somewhat idealized) model of non-professional human reasoning. See Bray and Savin
(1986), who used regression analysis to model the learning of economic agents.
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accuracy. Thus, the trade-oﬀ between simplicity and accuracy is inherent in
the problem of induction.
Regression analysis is an example of targeted learning. It is geared to
the prediction of a specific variable in a given set-up. Targeted learning
must provide an answer to a prediction problem, typically because a decision
is called for. But inductive learning can also be untargeted. Untargeted
inductive learning is a process by which rules are observed for future use,
without a concrete problem in mind. For example, the democratic peace
example above may be modelled as a rule, “democracies do not engage in
wars among themselves”. Such a rule does not predict when wars would occur
in general, nor does it state that dictatorships would necessarily declare wars
on other countries. It does, however, provide an observation that may prove
useful.
Observe that people engage in targeted as well as in untargeted learning.
In fact, it may be hard to avoid untargeted learning when the data seem
obviously to suggest an accurate and simple rule. One may speculate that
the human brain has evolved to engage in untargeted learning for several
reasons. First, since learning may be complex, it might be wise to perform
some learning tasks “oﬀ-line”, without a concrete goal in mind, and to retain
their output for future use. Second, memory constraints may not allow one
to retain all data. In such a case, a meaningful summary of the data is
called for, and untargeted learning may result in simple and accurate rules
that will be easy to remember, while retaining the most relevant parts of the
information.5
In this paper we deal with targeted as well as with untargeted learning.
We consider linear regression and non-parametric regression as models of tar-
geted learning, and we oﬀer two models of untargeted learning. Our focus
in these models is on the trade-oﬀ between simplicity and accuracy. This
5Observe that this process may generate biases as well. In particular, one may tend
to remember pieces of evidence that are consistent with the rules one has observed more
than one would remember inconsistent evidence.
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trade-oﬀ is especially conspicuous in a targeted learning problem, such as a
prediction problem, where one needs to select a single method for prediction.
But it is also implicitly present in untargeted learning, where one has to de-
cide which rules are worthwhile rememberingfor future use. Our main results
state that the trade-oﬀ between simplicity and accuracy is hard to perform.
The reason is that, in these models, determining whether there exists a rule
with pre-specified degrees of accuracy and of simplicity is a computation-
ally hard problem. It follows that people cannot be expected to know all
the possible rules that may apply to any database of more than trivial size.
This, in turn, may explain why people may be surprised to learn rules that
hold in a database they are already familiar with. Thus, the motivating
examples above may be explained by the computational complexity of the
accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ of inductive learning.
We employ a very simple model, in which observations (or past experi-
ences) are vectors of numbers. An entry in the vector might be the value
of a certain numerical variable, or a measure of the degree to which the
observation has a particular attribute. For the quality of government ex-
ample above, one vector might represent information for a single country
for a particular year, with the attributes/variables including the proportion
of the population of diﬀerent religious orientations, the linguistic and legal
background of the country, the physical location of the country, etc.Thus, we
model the information available to an individual as a database consisting of
a matrix of numbers, where rows correspond to observations (distinct pieces
of information) and columns to attributes.6
Targeted learning is modelled by functional rules: rules that point to a
functional relationship between several (“predicting”) variables and a given
variable(the “predicted” variable). A well-known example of such a ruleis
linear regression, where we take R2 to be a measure of accuracy and the
number of predictors to bea measure of complexity. However, we will also
6The degree to which an observation has a certain attribute will normally be in [0, 1].
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discuss non-parametric regression, where one may choose not only the set
of predicting variables but also any function thereof in attempting to fit the
predicted variable.
To model untargeted learning, we investigate two types of rules. The
first are exclusionary: they state that certain phenomena cannot occur.7 For
instance, consider the rule “There are no instances in which a democratic
country initiated war against another democratic country”. Formally, an ex-
clusionary rule is an assignment of values to a subset of columns, interpreted
as claiming that this combination of values cannot occur. It is likely that
there will often be counter-examples to conjectured rules. Indeed, the war
between England and the US in 1812 was quoted as a counter-example to
this rule. But such a counter-example need not render the rule useless. We
define a notion of accuracy of rules that can roughly be thought of as the
average degree to which the rule holds in the given knowledge base. As a
measure of the rule’s complexity we use the number of attributes it involves.
The second closely related type of rules are conditional : they state that if
an observation has certain attributes, then it also has another. For instance,
the rule “Democratic countries have universal schooling” can be thought of
as saying that if attribute “democratic” has the value 1, then so will attribute
“universal schooling”. Formally, a conditional rule is a pair, where the first
element is an assignment of values to certain columns, and the second is an
assignment of a value to another column, interpreted as claiming that the
first assignment necessitates the second. The complexity of a conditional rule
will be defined as the number of attributes it involves.
Conditional rules can be stated as exclusionary rules. For instance, “De-
mocratic countries have universal schooling” is equivalent to “There are no
countries without universal schooling that are democratic”. Conversely, ex-
clusionary rules can also be stated as conditional ones. For instance, the
7This is in line with Popper’s (1965) dictum, which suggested that a scientific theory
be formulated by stating what cannot happen, highlighting the conditions under which
the theory would be falsified.
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democratic peace phenomenon can be restated as “If two countries are de-
mocratic, then they will not initiate wars against each other”. Moreover, the
simplicity of a conditional rule is identical to the simplicity of the correspond-
ing exclusionary rule. However, we will argue below that the equivalence
between exclusionary and conditional rules only holds at perfect accuracy.
More generally, we find that natural definitions of the degree of accuracy
of these two types of rules are rather diﬀerent, and that one cannot easily
reduce one type of ruleto the other.
A functional rule can be viewed as the conjunction of many conditional
rules, each stating the value of the predicted variable for a particular com-
bination of values of the predicting variables. Yet, functional rules deserve a
separate discussion for several reasons. First, they are typically described in
a much more parsimonious way than the conjunction of conditional rules. In
fact, they are often represented by formulae that are defined for any combina-
tion of values of the predicting variables, and not only for the combinations
that appear in the database.8 Second, the way we assess their accuracy
also tends to diﬀer from the way we assess the accuracy of a collection of
conditional rules. Finally, functional rules represent targeted learning, and
they highlight the accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ when one is forced to make
a choice among (prediction) rules.
Our aim is to demonstrate that finding “good” rules, of any of the types
described above, is a diﬃcult computational task. We use the concept of
NP-Completeness from computer science to formalize the notion of diﬃculty
of solving problems. A yes/no problem is NP if it is easy to verify that a
suggested solution is indeed a solution to it. When an NP problem is also NP-
Complete, there is no known algorithm, whose (worst-case time) complexity
8The fact that a functional rule is formally represented by a function whose domain
extends beyond the given database does not imply that the rule would necessarily hold for
combinations of values that have not been encountered. Moreover, the rule may not hold
even in future observations of combinations of values that have already been observed in
the past. We return to this point below.
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is polynomial, that can solve it. However, NP-Completeness means somewhat
more than the fact that there is no such known algorithm. The non-existence
of such an algorithm is not due to the fact that the problem is new or that
little attention has been devoted to it. For NP-Complete problems it is
known that, if a polynomial algorithm were found for one of them, such an
algorithm could be translated into algorithms for all other problems in NP.
Thus, a problem that is NP-Complete is at least as hard as many problems
that have been thoroughly studied for years by academics, and for which no
polynomial algorithm was found to date.
An appendix describes the notion of NP-Completeness more fully. For
the time being, it suﬃces to mention that NP-Completeness, and the related
concept of NP-Hardness, are the standard concepts of computational diﬃ-
culty used in computer science, and that NP-Complete problems are generally
considered to be intractable.
We show that finding simple rules is a computationally hard problem.
Formally, once the concepts of a rule and its accuracy are defined, we prove
that the question “Is there a rule employing no more than k attributes that
has a given accuracy level?” is NP-Complete. This result holds for lin-
ear regression, for non-parametric regression, for exclusionary rules, and for
conditional rules.
Our measures of the simplicity of rules is admittedly crude, but it oﬀers a
reasonable approximation to the intuitive notion of complexity, especially in
the absence of additional structure that may distinguish among attributes.
We should emphasize that the rules we discuss here have no pretense
to oﬀer complete theories, identify causal relationships, provide predictions,
or suggest courses of action. Rules are merely regularities that happen to
hold in a given database, and they may be purely coincidental. Some of the
examples and terminology we use may suggest that these rules are backed
by theories, but we do not purport to model the entire process of developing
and choosing among theories.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next two sections are
devoted to formal modelling of targeted and untargeted learning and to a
statement of the complexity results. Section 6 concludes. It is followed by
two appendices. Appendix A contains proofs of all results, and Appendix B
contains an informal introduction to the theory of computational complexity
and NP-Completeness.
4 Targeted Learning
4.1 Linear Regression
Assume that we are trying to predict a variable Y given the predictors X =
(X1, ..., Xm). For a subset K of {X1, ..., Xm}, let R2K be the value of the
coeﬃcient of determination R2 when we regress (yi)i≤n on (xij)i≤n,j∈K .
Throughout this paper we assume that the data are given in their entirety,
that is, that there are no missing values. Incomplete matrices or vectors
introduce conceptual issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
How does one select a set of predictors? That is, how does one select a
functional rule? Let us first consider the feasible set of rules, projected onto
the accuracy-complexity space. For a set of predictors K, let the degree of
complexity be k = |K| and a degree of accuracy — r = R2. Consider the k-r
space and, for a given database X = (X1, ...,Xm) and a variable Y , denote
by F (X,Y ) the set of pairs (k, r) for which there exists a rule with these
parameters. Because the set F (X) is only defined for integer values of k, and
for certain values of r, it may be more convenient to define a connected set:
F 0(X,Y ) ≡ { (k, r) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] |∃(k0, r0) ∈ F (X,Y ), k ≥ k0, r ≤ r0 }
The set F 0(X,Y ) is schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Notice that it
need not be convex.
_________________________
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Insert Figure 1 about here
_________________________
It seems reasonable that, other things being equal, people would prefer
both simplicity (low k) and accuracy (high r). How does a person make
this trade-oﬀ? One possibility is that a person may be ascribed a function
v : R+×[0, 1]→ R that represents her preferences for simplicity and accuracy.
For example, the widely used adjusted R2 can be viewed as such a function.9
Thus, if v(·, ·) is decreasing in its first argument and increasing in the second,
a person who chooses a rule so as to maximize v may be viewed as if she
prefers both simplicity and accuracy, and trades them oﬀ as described by v.
The optimization problem that such a person faces is depicted in Figure 2.
_________________________
Insert Figure 2 about here
_________________________
This optimization problem is hard to solve, because one generally cannot
know its feasible set. More precisely, given X,Y, k, r, determining whether
(k, r) ∈ F 0(X,Y ) is computationally hard. Formally, we define
Problem LINEAR REGRESSION: Given a matrix X and a vector
Y , a natural number k ≥ 1, and a real number r ∈ [0, 1], is there a subset K
of {X1, ..., Xm} such that |K| ≤ k and R2K ≥ r?
Theorem 1 LINEAR REGRESSION is an NP-Complete problem.
This result shows that it is a hard problem to find the smallest set of
variables that obtain a pre-specified level of R2. Alternatively, it can be
9Observe that the adjusted R2 is a function of the degree of accuracy, R2, of the degree
of complexity, k, as well as of the number of observations, n. As long as we compare rules
given a fixed database, n is identical for all candidate prediction rules and need not appear
explicitly as an argument of the function v. We return to this issue below.
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viewed as pointing out that finding the highest R2 for a pre-specified number
of variables k is a hard problem.
Theorem 1 might explain why people may be surprised to learn of simple
regularities that exist in a database they have access to. A person who
has access to the data should, in principle, be able to assess the veracity
of all linear theories pertaining to these data. Yet, due to computational
complexity, this capability remains theoretical. In practice one may often
find that one has overlooked a simple linear regularity that, once pointed
out, seems evident.
While the focus of this paper is on everyday human reasoning, Theorem
1 can also be interpreted as a result about scientific research. It is often
the case that a scientist is trying to regress a variable Y on some predictors
(Xj)j, and to find a small set of predictors that provide a good fit. Our
result shows that many practicing scientists can be viewed as coping with a
problem that is NP-Hard.
There is definitely more to scientific research than finding a small set
of variables that provide a good fit. Yet, scientific research needs to take
goodness of fit and complexity into account. While our model does not
capture many other aspects of scientific research, it highlights the inherent
diﬃculty of this one.
Our discussion here (and throughout the paper) presupposes a fixed data-
base X. In reality, however, one may have to choose among prediction rules
that were obtained given diﬀerent databases. For instance, assume that two
researchers collected data in an attempt to predict a variable Y . Researcher
A collected 1,000 observations of the variables W , Z, and Y , and obtained
R2 = .9 (for Y regressed on W and Z). Researcher B collected two obser-
vations of the variables T and Y and, quite expectedly, obtained R2 = 1
(for Y regressed on T ). Observe that the two databases cannot be combined
into a single database, since they contain information regarding diﬀerent
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variables.10 Which prediction rule should we use?
While database A suggests a rule that is both less accurate and more
complex than the rule suggested by database B, one would be expected to
prefer the former to the latter. Indeed, obtaining R2 = .9 with two variables
and 1,000 observations is a much more impressive feat than obtaining a per-
fect fit with one variable and two observations. Rules should be accurate and
simple, but also general. Other things being equal, a rule that has a higher
degree of generality, or a larger scope of applicability, is preferred to a rule
that was found to hold in a smaller database. With a given database, all pre-
diction rules have the same scope of applicability, and thus this criterion may
be suppressed from the rule selection problem. Yet, in a more general set-up,
we should expect accuracy and simplicity to be traded oﬀ with generality as
well.11
We have shown that determining whether a given pair (k, r) is in F 0(X,Y )
is a hard problem when the input is (X,Y, k, r). In the proof, however, we
only use the value r = 1. Thus, we actually prove a stronger result, namely,
that the following problem is also NP-Complete: “Given a database X, a
variable Y , and a natural number k, is there a set of predictors that uses no
more than k variables and that achievesR2 = 1?” (Observe that this problem
trivially reduces to LINEAR REGRESSION.) If we replace the value 1 above
by a pre-determined degree of accuracy r, we obtain a family of problems
parametrized by r. Our proof can be easily modified to show that these
problems are also NP-Complete for any positive value of r.12
It follows that, for any positive value of r, it is also hard to determine
10To be precise, a combination of the databases would result in a database with many
missing values. Indeed, a theory of induction that is general enough to encompass data-
bases with missing values will be able to deal with induction given diﬀerent databases as
well.
11In sub-section 5.3 we discuss rules that vary in their degree of applicability even though
they are derived from the same database.
12The results that follow are also stated for the case that r is given as input. All of
them are proven for the case r = 1, and all of them can be strengthened to show that the
respective problems are NP-Complete for ranges of values of r.
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whether a given k is in the r-cut of F 0(X,Y ) when the input is (X,Y, k). For
a given k, computing the k-cut of F 0(X,Y ) is a polynomial problem (when
the input is (X,Y, r)), bounded by a polynomial of degree k. Recall, however,
that k is bounded only by the number of columns in X. Thus, finding the
frontier of the set F 0(X,Y ), as a function of X and Y , is a hard problem.
The optimization problem depicted in Figure 2 has a fuzzy feasible set, as
described in Figure 3.
_________________________
Insert Figure 3 about here
_________________________
A predictor or a decision maker may choose a functional rule that max-
imizes v(k, r) out of all the rules she is aware of, but the latter are likely to
constitute only a subset of the set of rules defining the actual set F 0(X,Y ).
Hence, many of the rules that people formulate are not necessarily the sim-
plest (for a given degree of accuracy) or the most accurate (for a given degree
of complexity).
4.2 Non-Parametric Regression
Linear regression may not always be the most natural model of prediction.
First, one may wish to consider non-linear functions. Second, one may not
wish to commit to a particular functional form. Consider, for example the
variable “the degree of corruption of the judiciary”. Such a variable allows
more than one obvious quantification. However, the choice of a quantification
should be made in tandem with the choice of the functional form of the
regression.
In this sub-section we focus on the informational content of the variables.
Thus, we consider a regression problem in which one is free to choose both a
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set of predicting variables and a function thereof that approximates a given
variable. We refer to this problem as non-parametric regression.13
Consider a database consisting of observations, or cases C = {1, ..., n},
with attributes (predicting variables) A = {1, ...,m}. The data are X =
(xij)i≤n,j≤m and Y = (yi)i≤n where xij, yi ∈ R. We wish to predict the value
of Y as a function of (Xj)j≤m.
Let a predictor for Y be a pair (E, g) where E ⊂ A and g : RE → R.
Given a predictor for Y , (E, g), it is natural to define its degree of inaccuracy
in case i ∈ C as the squared error:
SE((E, g), i) = (g(xij)j∈E − yi)2
and its degree of accuracy over the entire database as the mean squared error:
MSE(E, g) = 1
n
P
i≤n SE((E, g), i).
Thus, MSE(E, g) corresponds to the mean of squared errors (MSE) in
linear regression analysis.
Observe that if the matrix X and the vector Y are sampled from a con-
tinuous joint distribution, then, with probability 1 all values of each variable
are distinct. In this case, every single variable Xj (defining E = {j}) will
predict Y perfectly for an appropriately chosen function g : R → R. The
accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ is rather trivial in this situation. But this is not
the case if, for instance, the variables can assume only finitely many values,
and, in particular, if these are binary variables that indicate the existence
of attributes in cases. In this situation, some values of each variable Xj are
likely to recur, and it is no longer clear whether Y is a function of a particular
13We remind the reader that our use of the terms “predicting variables” and “predicted
variable” should be taken with a grain of salt. This section addresses the formal problem of
finding a set of variables that, in a given database, provides a good fit to another variable.
Such a set of variables need not suggest a theory by which one can predict, let alone
influence, the so-called “predicted variable”.
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Xj or of a combination of several Xj’s. In interpreting the following result,
the reader is asked to focus on models in which it is not implausible to find
recurring values in the matrix X and the vector Y .14
We define the following problem:
Problem NON-PARAMETRIC REGRESSION: Given a matrixX
and a vector Y , a natural number k ≥ 1 and a real number r ∈ R, is there a
predictor for Y , (E, g), such that |E| ≤ k and MSE(E, g) ≤ r?
Theorem 2 NON-PARAMETRIC REGRESSION is an NP-Complete prob-
lem.
Notice that this theorem is not implied by the previous one. That is,
the fact that it is hard to tell whether a linear relationship (with parameters
(k, r)) exists does not imply that it is hard to tell whether any functional
relationship (with these parameters) exists. While a sub-class of functions
is easier to exhaust, solution algorithms are not restricted to enumeration of
all possible functions.
It follows that looking at a database and finding functional relationships
in it is, in general, a hard problem. Correspondingly, one may be surprised
to be told that such a functional relationship holds, even if, in principle, one
had all the information needed to find it.
5 Untargeted Learning
5.1 Exclusionary Rules
Rules have traditionally been modelled by propositional logic, which may
capture rather sophisticated formal relationships (see Carnap (1950)). By
contrast, we oﬀer here a very simplified model of rules, aiming to facilitate
14When X and Y are sampled from a continuous joint distribution, one may wish to
restrict the function g (say, to be Lipschitzian with constant bounded away from 0) and
obtain similar results.
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the discussion of the process of induction, and to highlight its the similarity
of rules to regression analysis.15
As above, let C = {1, ..., n} be the set of observations, or cases, and
A = {1, ...,m} — the set of variables, or attributes. We assume that data are
given by a matrix X = (xij)i≤n,j≤m of real numbers in [0, 1], such that, for
all i ≤ n, j ≤ m, xij measures the degree to which case i has attribute j.16
Observe that no predicted variable Y is given in this problem.
An exclusionary rule is a pair (E,ϕ) such that E ⊂ A and ϕ : E →
{0, 1}.17 The interpretation of the exclusionary rule (E,ϕ) is that there is
no case whose values on the attributes in E coincide with ϕ. For instance,
assume that the set of cases consists of countries at given years. Saying
that “democratic countries provide universal education” would correspond
to setting E = {democratic, universal_education} and ϕ(democratic) =
1, ϕ(universal_education) = 0, stating that one cannot find a case of a
democratic country that did not provide universal education.
To what extent does an exclusionary rule (E,ϕ) hold in a database X?
Let us begin by asking to what extent the rule applies to a particular case i.
We suggest that this be measured by18
15For other approaches to modelling learning processes, see Mitchell (1997).
16The restriction of xij to the unit interval is immaterial. It is designed to facilitate the
interpretation of xij as the degree to which a case has an attribute. However, our results
hold also if xij are unrestricted.
17One may also define ϕ : E → [0, 1], and allow rules to have intermediate values of the
attributes. For some purposes it may even be useful to let ϕ assume interval values, that
is, to exclude ranges of the attribute value. Our analysis can be extended to these more
general cases.
18There are many alternatives to this measure. First, one may choose absolute value
of the diﬀerence instead of its square. We chose the latter mostly for consistency with
standard statistical measures. Second, sets of attributes can be used for evaluation of
accuracy. Specifically, consider the measure
θ((E,ϕ), i) = max∅ 6=F⊂E 1|F |
P
j∈F (xij − ϕ(j))2.
Our results hold for this measure as well.
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θ((E,ϕ), i) = maxj∈E(xij − ϕ(j))2.
Thus, if case i is a clear-cut counter-example to the rule (E,ϕ), i will be a
case in which all attributes inE have the values specified for them by ϕ. That
is, xij = ϕ(j) for all j ∈ E, and then θ((E,ϕ), i) = 0. By contrast, if at least
one of the attributes in E is not shared by i at all, that is, (xij − ϕ(j))2 = 1
for at least one j ∈ E, then θ((E,ϕ), i) = 1, reflecting the fact that i fails to
constitute a counter-example to (E,ϕ), and thus (E,ϕ) holds in case i.
Generally, the closer are the values (xij)j∈E to (ϕ(j))j∈E, the closer is
i to being a counter-example to (E,ϕ). For instance, one might wonder
whether the Falkland Islands war is a counter-example to the democratic
peace rule. To this end, one must determine the extent to whichArgentina
was a democracy at that time. The more is Argentina deemed democratic,
the stronger is the contradiction suggested by this example to the general
rule.
Given the degree to which a rule (E,ϕ) applies in each case i, it is natural
to define the degree of accuracy of the rule (E,ϕ) given the entire database
X as its average applicability over the individual cases:19
θ(E,ϕ) = 1
n
P
i≤n θ((E,ϕ), i).
This definition appears to be reasonable when the database contains cases
that were not selectively chosen. Observe that one may increase the value
of θ(E,ϕ) by adding cases to C, in which rule (E,ϕ) has no bite and is
therefore vacuously true. For instance, the veracity of the democratic peace
phenomenon will be magnified if we add many cases in which no conflict
occurred. We implicitly assume that only relevant cases are included in C.
More generally, one may augment the model by a relevance function, and
weight cases in θ(E,ϕ) by this function.20
19To simplify notation, we use the letter θ for diﬀerent domains. Throughout this paper
it is a measure of accuracy of a rule.
20The notion of conditional rules (in sub-section 5.3 below) oﬀers another solution to
this problem.
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In untargeted learning, one need not select a single rule by which to
perform prediction. Rather, one may maintain many rules that appear to
be valid, and to use them when the need may arise. Yet, people tend to
prefer simpler rules also in the context of untargeted learning. For instance,
the rule “democratic countries provide universal education” is more complex
than the rule “there is always universal education”, corresponding to the set
E = {universal_education} and ϕ(universal_education) = 0. If, indeed,
the column universal_education in the matrix X consisted of ones alone,
it is more likely that one would come up with the generalization that there
is always universal education than with the democracy—universal education
relationship.
In our model, the complexity of a rule (E,ϕ) is naturally modelled by the
number of attributes it refers to, namely, |E|. Thus, performing induction
may be viewed as looking for a small set E that, coupled with an appropriate
ϕ, will have a high degree of accuracy θ(E,ϕ).
Parallelingthe discussion in the context of linear regression, one may de-
note by F (X) the set of pairs (k, r) for which there exists a rule with degree
of accuracy r and degree of complexity k. Again, one may define
F 0(X) ≡ { (k, r) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] |∃(k0, r0) ∈ F (X), k ≥ k0, r ≤ r0 }
as the feasible set of (k, r) pairs. Out of this set, a subset of rules will be
noticed and remembered. One may assume that, for a function v : R+ ×
[0, 1] → R that is decreasing in its first argument and increasing in the
second, and for an appropriate constant c ∈ R, the subset of rules that
a person would notice and remember are those for which v(k, r) ≥ c, as
depicted in Figure 4.
_________________________
Insert Figure 4 about here
_________________________
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A person who considers possible rules is confronted with the following
problem: given a database X and a pair k, r, is it the case that (k, r) ∈
F 0(X)? Or, diﬀerently stated:
Problem INDUCTION: Given a matrix X, a natural number k ≥ 1
and a real number r ∈ [0, 1], is there an exclusionary rule (E,ϕ) such that
|E| ≤ k and θ(E,ϕ) ≥ r?
We can now state the following result.
Theorem 3 INDUCTION is an NP-Complete problem.
As mentioned above, the proof of Theorem 3 can be modified to show that
the problem remains NP-Complete even if r is fixed, for a range of values of
r.
5.2 Simple Exclusionary Rules
The induction problem stated above is computationally hard for two com-
binatorial reasons: first, there are many subsets E that may be relevant to
the rule. Second, for each given E there are many assignments of values
ϕ. Our intuitive discussion, however, focussed on the first issue: we claim
that it is hard to find minimal regularities because there are many subsets of
variables one has to consider. It is natural to wonder whether the complexity
of problem INDUCTION is due to the multitude of assignments ϕ, and has
little to do with our intuitive reasoning about the multitude of subsets.21
We therefore devote this sub-section to simple exclusionary rules, defined
as exclusionary rules (E,ϕ) where ϕ ≡ 1. A simple exclusionary rule can
thus be identified by a subset E ⊂ A. We denote θ((E,ϕ), i) by θ(E, i), and
θ(E,ϕ) — by θ(E). Explicitly,
21This concern can only be aggravated by reading our proof: we actually use all at-
tributes in the proof of complexity, relying solely on the diﬃculty of finding the assignment
β.
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θ(E, i) = maxj∈E(1− xij)2.
and
θ(E) = 1
n
P
i≤n θ(E, i).
We now formulate the following problem:
Problem SIMPLE INDUCTION: Given a matrix X, a natural num-
ber k ≥ 1 and a real number r ∈ [0, 1], is there a simple exclusionary rule
E ⊂ A such that |E| ≤ k and θ(E) ≥ r?
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 4 SIMPLE INDUCTION is an NP-Complete problem.
It follows that the diﬃculty of the problem INDUCTION is not an artifact
of the function ϕ, but rather, has to do also with the selection of variables
one considers.22
5.3 Conditional Rules
Rules are often formulated as conditional statements. For instance, it is more
natural to state the rule “All ravens are black”, or “If x is a raven, then x
is black” then the rule “There are no non-black ravens”. Obviously, the two
formulations are equivalent, and they are both equivalent to “If x is not black,
then x is not a raven”. Indeed, this equivalence lies at the heart of Hempel’s
(1945) paradox of confirmation. Yet, this equivalence holds only when the
22SIMPLE INDUCTION deals with
µ
m
k
¶
possible selections of subsets of k columns.
INDUCTION, by contrast, deals with
µ
m
k
¶
2k selections of binary values for k columns.
Yet, the fact that SIMPLE INDUCTION is NP-Complete does not mean that INDUC-
TION is as well. The reason is that one is not restricted to algorithms that exhaust
all possible solutions. Using certain properties of a problem, one may be able to find a
solution in a larger set of possible solutions more eﬃciently than in a smaller set.
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rules are supposed to be perfectly accurate. By contrast, when we are trying
to assess their degree of accuracy in general, this equivalence breaks down,
as we explain shortly. We therefore introduce conditional rules as a separate
formal entity.
Let a conditional rule be a pair ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) such that E Ã A, ϕ : E →
{0, 1}, j ∈ A\E, and b ∈ {0, 1}. The interpretation of the conditional rule
((E,ϕ), (j, b)) is that, whenever the attributes in E assume the correspond-
ing values specified by ϕ, attribute j assumes the value b. Thus, the rule
“All ravens are black” can be modelled by setting E = {raven}, ϕ(raven) =
1, j = black, b = 1. Similarly, the democratic peace phenomenon may
be captured by E = {country_1_democratic, country_2_democratic},
ϕ(country_1_democratic) = ϕ(country_2_democratic) = 1, j = war, and
b = 0.
Observe that, if E = ∅, the conditional rule states that attribute j always
assumes the value b. It thus corresponds to the exclusionary rule that rules
out the value (1− b) for attribute j.
To what extent does conditional rule ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) hold in case i? We
propose that the applicability of the rule in the case be measured by
θ(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i) = (xij − b)2.
That is, in each particular case, the rule is judged solely by the degree
to which the case agrees with the rule’s consequent. However, not all cases
are going to be equally relevant to the assessment of the rule given the entire
database. Intuitively, the rule “All ravens are black” should be assessed based
on ravens alone. Thus, a case is relevant to the assessment of a rule to the
degree that it oﬀers an example of the antecedent of the rule. Formally, let
w(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i) = 1−maxl∈E(xil − ϕ(l))2.
(This expression is assumed to be 1 if E = ∅.)23
23Observe that, using the notation from sub-section 5.1, the weight w can be written as
24
Thus, if case i agrees with ϕ on all attributes specified in E, it is a very
relevant test case for the rule. If, however, at least one of the attributes of
case i is completely diﬀerent from ϕ (that is, for one l ∈ E, (xil−ϕ(l))2 = 1),
then case i is irrelevant to the rule, and should not be part of its evaluation.
With this definition, it is natural to define the degree to which conditional
rule ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) holds in the entire database by
θ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) =
P
i≤n w(((E,ϕ),(j,b)),i)θ(((E,ϕ),(j,b)),i)P
i≤n w(((E,ϕ),(j,b)),i)
in case the denominator does not vanish. If it does, we define θ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) =
1.
Thus, a rule is evaluated by a weighted average of the extent to which it
holds in each particular case, where the weights are defined by an endogenous
relevance function. According to this definition, “All ravens are black” will
be assessed based on the population of ravens, whereas “Everything that is
not black is not a raven” will be judged by its correctness in the population
of non-black objects. If one of these rules is true to degree 1, so is the other.24
But if their degrees of correctness are in [0, 1), they need not be equal. In
fact, they can be as diﬀerent as this half-open interval allows.25
w(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i) = 1− θ((E,ϕ), i).
θ((E,ϕ), i) measures the degree to which case i satisfies the assignment ϕ over the set
E. For an exclusionary rule, a high θ indicates that the case is a counter-example to the
rule. For the antecedent of a conditional rule, a high θ indicates low relevance of the case
to the rule.
24Observe that the populations are defined as fuzzy sets. For instance, each case i oﬀers
an example of a raven — say, attribute l — to a continuous degree xil ∈ [0, 1].
For a conditional rule to be true to degree 1, every case i withP
i≤nw(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i) > 0 has to satisfy xij = b. In the example, “All ravens
are black” holds to degree 1 if and only if every observation that is at least partly a raven
is absolutely black. Equivalently, every example has to be absolutely black, or absolutely
not a raven. This is equivalent to the fact that the exclusionary rule “There are no
non-black ravens” holds to degree 1.
25For instance, in a database with n− 1 black ravens and one white raven, “All ravens
are black” will be true to degree 1− 1n whereas “All non-black objects are not ravens” —
to degree 0.
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The definition above allows a conditional rule to be vacuously true (ifP
i≤nw(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i) = 0) but it does not allow irrelevant examples to
aﬀect the truthfulness of a conditional rule in the presence of relevant ex-
amples. Thus, in a database that consists only of white shoes, “All ravens
are black” will be deemed correct. But if there is but one case that is, to
some degree, a raven, white shoes become irrelevant. One might view this
formulation as a “resolution” of Hempel’s paradox of confirmation, although
this is not our purpose here.26
It is natural to define the complexity of a conditional rule ((E,ϕ), (j, b))
by |E| + 1. (A conditional rule of complexity 1 would correspond to the
case E = ∅.) The trade-oﬀ between accuracy and simplicity exists here
as well. Indeed, finding whether, for pre-specified k ≥ 1 and r ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a conditional rule ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) of complexity k or less, that
achieves θ((E,ϕ), (j, b)) ≥ r, is also an NP-Complete problem. We omit the
formal statement of this result and its proof because both closely mimic the
statement and the proof of Theorem 3.
As opposed to exclusionary rules, conditional rules do not apply to the
entire database. The scope of a conditional rule depends on the cases that
satisfy its antecedents, as measured by
P
i≤nw(((E,ϕ), (j, b)), i). It follows
that conditional rules diﬀer from each other not only in their accuracy and
in their complexity, but also in their generality, or scope of applicability. As
discussed in sub-section 4.1, one would be expected to prefer, other things
being equal, more general rules, which have a larger scope of applicability, and
which are thus likely to be more useful in future decisions. An explicit model
of the trade-oﬀ between accuracy, simplicity, and applicability is beyond the
scope of this paper.
26There are many other resolutions of this paradox in the literature. One that we
found particularly convincing is oﬀered by Gilboa (1993). It argues that, to anyone whose
intuition was shaped by Bayesian thinking, there is nothing paradoxical about Hempel’s
paradox, provided that one carefully distinguishes between weak and strict inequalities in
comparing posterior to prior.
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6 Conclusion
6.1 Related Literature
Most of the formal literature in economic theory and in related fields adheres
to the Bayesian model of information processing. In this model a decision
maker starts out with a prior probability, and she updates it in the face of new
information by Bayes rule. Hence, this model can easily capture changes in
opinion that result from new information. But it does not deal very graciously
with changes of opinion that are not driven by new information. In fact, in a
Bayesian model with perfect rationality people cannot change their opinions
unless new information has been received. It follows that the example we
started out with cannot be explained by such models.
Relaxing the perfect rationality assumption, one may attempt to provide a
pseudo-Bayesian account of the phenomena discussed here. For instance, one
can use a space of states of the world to describe the subjective uncertainty
that a decision maker has regarding the result of a computation, before this
computation is carried out. (See Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar,
Casadesus-Masanell, and Ozdenoren (1999).) In such a model, one would be
described as if one entertained a prior probability of, say p, that “democratic
peace” holds. Upon hearing the rhetorical question as in our dialogue, the
decision maker performs the computation of the accuracy of this rule, and is
described as if the result of this computation were new information.
A related approach employs a subjective state space to provide a Bayesian
account of unforeseen contingencies. (See Kreps (1979, 1992), and Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (1997, 1998).) Should this approach be applied to the
problem of induction, each regularity that might hold in the data base would
be viewed as an unforeseen contingency that might arise. A decision maker’s
behavior will then be viewed as arising from Bayesian optimization with
respect to a subjective state space that reflects her subjective uncertainty.
Our approach models the process of induction more explicitly. In com-
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parison with pseudo-Bayesian approaches, it allows a better understanding
of why and when induction is likely to be a hard problem.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) oﬀer a theory of case-based decision mak-
ing. They argue that cases are the primitive objects of knowledge, and that
rules and probabilities are derived from cases. Moreover, rules and probabili-
ties cannot be known in the same sense, and to the same degree of certitude,
that cases can. Yet, rules and probabilities may be eﬃcient and insight-
ful ways of succinctly summarizing many cases. The present paper may be
viewed as an attempt to model the process by which rules are generated from
cases.27
6.2 Discussion
There is an alternative approach to modelling induction that potentially pro-
vides a more explicit account of the components of cases. The components
should include entities and relations among them. For example, our moti-
vating examples give rise to entities such as countries and governments, and
to the relations “fought against” and “exhibits inferior performance”, among
others. In a formal model, entities would be elements of an abstract set, and
relations, or predicates, would be modeled as functions from sequences of en-
tities into [0, 1]. Such a predicate model would provide more structure, would
be closer to the way people think of complex problems, and would allow a
more intuitive modelling of analogies than one can obtain from our present
model. Moreover, while the mathematical notation required to describe a
predicate model is more cumbersome than that used for the attribute model
above, the description of actual problems within the predicate model may
be more concise. In particular, this implies that problems that are computa-
tionally easy in the attribute model may still be computationally hard with
27Gilboa and Schmeidler (1999, 2002) attempt to model the process by which cases are
used to form probabilistic beliefs.
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respect to the predicate model.28
Observe that neither the model presented here nor the alternative predi-
cate model attempts to explain how people choose the predicates or attributes
they use to describe cases. The importance of this choice has been clearly
illustrated by Goodman’s (1965) “grue-bleen” paradox.29 This problem is,
however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
We do not claim that the inability to solve NP-Complete problems is nec-
essarily the most important cognitive limitation on people’s ability to perform
induction. Indeed, even polynomial problems can be diﬃcult to solve when
the database consists of many cases and many attributes. On the other hand,
it is often the case that looking for a general rule does not even cross some-
one’s mind. Yet, the diﬃculty of performing induction shares an important
property with NP-Complete problems: while it is hard to come up with a
solution to such a problem, it is easy to verify whether a suggested solution
is valid. Similarly, it is hard to come up with an appropriate generalization,
but it is relatively easy to assess the applicability of such a generalization
once it is oﬀered.
We need not assume that people are lazy or irrational to explain why
they do not find all relevant rules. Rather, looking for simple regularities is a
genuinely hard problem. There is nothing irrational about not being able to
solve NP-Hard problems. Faced with the induction problems discussed here,
28In Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2001), we present both the attribute
and the predicate models for the study of analogies, prove their equivalence in terms of
the scope of phenomena they can describe, and show that finding a good analogy in the
predicate model is a hard problem.
29The paradox is, in a nutshell, the following. If one wishes to test whether emeralds are
green or blue, one can sample emeralds and conclude that they seem to be green. Based on
this, one may predict that emeralds will be green in the year 2010. Next assume that one
starts with two other primitive predicates, “grue” and “bleen”. When translated to the
more common predicates “green” and “blue”, “grue” means “green until 2010 and blue
thereafter” and “bleen” — vice versa. With these predicates, emeralds appear to be grue,
and one may conclude that they will appear blue after the year 2010. This paradox may
be interpreted as showing that inductive inference, as well as the concept of simplicity,
depend on the predicates one starts out with.
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which are NP-Hard, people may use various heuristics to find rules, but they
cannot be sure, in general, that the rules they find are the simplest ones.
6.3 Implications
Our results have several implications. First, we find that people may behave
diﬀerently if their information consists of raw data as compared to rules
that summarize these data. Importantly, the raw data may not be more
informative than the rules that are derived from them, because this derivation
is a non-trivial task. Second, the complexity results might explain why people
may prefer to summarize information and make predictions using simple rules
that do not employ more than a few variables. Whereas it is generally hard
to find whether a certain degree of accuracy can be obtained with a given
number of variables, one may find, in polynomial time complexity, the most
accurate rule among those that use no more than, say, two variables.
Our model suggests two distinct reasons for which people who have access
to the same information might entertain diﬀerent beliefs and make diﬀerent
decisions. The first is that, due to the complexity problem, diﬀerent people
may happen to uncover diﬀerent rules, while there is no reason to believe
that any one of them can necessarily find the rules discovered by the others.
The second reason has to do with personal tastes. Even if two people face the
same set of rules, reflected in a set F as in Figure 2, they might have diﬀerent
preferences for the accuracy-simplicity trade-oﬀ (captured by the function
v). Such preferences determine these individuals’ beliefs, as reflected in the
predictions and decisions that they are likely to make.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
It is easy to see that LINEAR REGRESSION is in NP: given a suggested
set K ⊂ {1, ...,m}, one may calculate R2K in polynomial time in |K|n (which
is bounded by the size of the input, (m + 1)n).30 To show that LINEAR
REGRESSION is NP-Complete, we use a reduction of the following problem,
which is known to be NP-Complete (see Gary and Johnson (1979)):
Problem EXACT COVER: Given a set S, a set of subsets of S, S,
are there pairwise disjoint subsets in S whose union equals S?
(That is, does a subset of S constitutes a partition of S?)
Given a set S, a set of subsets of S, S, we will generate n observations of
(m+1) variables, (xij)i≤n,j≤m and (yi)i≤n, a natural number k and a number
r ∈ [0, 1] such that S has an exact cover in S iﬀ there is a subset K of
{1, ...,m} with |K| ≤ k and R2K ≥ r.
Let there be given, then, S andS. Assume without loss of generality that
S = {1, ..., s}, and thatS = {S1, ..., Sl} (where s, l ≥ 1 are natural numbers).
We construct n = s+l+1 observations ofm = 2l predicting variables. It will
be convenient to denote the predicting variables by X1, ..., Xl and Z1, ..., Zl
and the predicted variable — by Y . Their corresponding values will be denoted
(xij)i≤n,j≤l, (zij)i≤n,j≤l, and (yi)i≤n. We will use Xj, Zj, and Y also to denote
the column vectors (xij)i≤n, (zij)i≤n, and (yi)i≤n, respectively.31 We now
specify these vectors.
For i ≤ s and j ≤ l, xij = 1 if i ∈ Sj and xij = 0 if i /∈ Sj;
30Here and in the sequel we assume that reading an entry in the matrix X or in the
vector Y , as well any algebraic computation require a single time unit. Our results hold
also if one assumes that xij and yi are all rational and takes into account the time it takes
to read and manipulate these numbers.
31In terms of our formal model, the variables may well be defined by these vectors to
begin with. However, in the context of statistical sampling, the variables are defined in a
probabilistic model, and identifying them with the corresponding vectors of observations
constitutes an abuse of notation.
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For i ≤ s and j ≤ l, zij = 0;
For s < i ≤ s+ l and j ≤ l, xij = zij = 1 if i = s+ j and xij = zij = 1 if
i 6= s+ j;
For j ≤ l, xnj = znj = 0;
For i ≤ s+ l, yi = 1 and yn = 0.
We claim that there is a subset K of {X1, ...,Xl}∪{Z1, ..., Zl} with |K| ≤
k ≡ l for which R2K ≥ r ≡ 1 iﬀ S has an exact cover from S.
First assume that such a cover exists. That is, assume that there is a set
J ⊂ {1, ..., l} such that {Sj}j∈J constitutes a partition of S. This means thatP
j∈J 1Sj = 1S where 1A is the indicator function of a set A. Let α be the
intercept, (βj)j≤l be the coeﬃcients of (Xj)j≤l and (γj)j≤l — of (Zj)j≤l in the
regression. Set α = 0. For j ∈ J , set βj = 1 and γj = 0, and for j /∈ J set
βj = 0 and γj = 1. We claim that α1+
P
j≤l βjXj +
P
j≤l γjZj = Y where
1 is a vector of 1’s. For i ≤ s the equality
α+
P
j≤l βjxij +
P
j≤l γjzij =
P
j≤l βjxij = yi = 1
follows from
P
j∈J 1Sj = 1S. For s < i ≤ s+ l, the equality
α+
P
j≤l βjxij +
P
j≤l γjzij = βj + γj = yi = 1
follows from our construction (assigning precisely one of {βj, γj} to 1 and
the other — to 0). Obviously, α +
P
j≤l βjxnj +
P
j≤l γjznj = 0 = yi = 0.
The number of variables used in this regression is l. Specifically, choose
K = {Xj | j ∈ J } ∪ {Zj | j /∈ J }, with |K| = l, and observe that R2K = 1.
We now turn to the converse direction. Assume, then, that there is a
subset K of {X1, ...,Xl} ∪ {Z1, ..., Zl} with |K| ≤ l for which R2K = 1.
Equality for observation n implies that this regression has an intercept of
zero (α = 0 in the notation above). Let J ⊂ {1, ..., l} be the set of indices
of the X variables in K, i.e., {Xj}j∈J = K ∩ {X1, ..., Xl}. We will show
that {Sj}j∈J constitutes a partition of S. Set L ⊂ {1, ..., l} be the set of
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indices of the Z variables in K, i.e., {Zj}j∈L = K∩{Z1, ..., Zl}. Consider the
coeﬃcients of the variables in K used in the regression obtaining R2K = 1.
Denote them by (βj)j∈J and (γj)j∈L. Define βj = 0 if j /∈ J and γj = 0 if
j /∈ L. Thus, we have P
j≤l βjXj +
P
j≤l γjZj = Y .
We argue that βj = 1 for every j ∈ J and γj = 1 for every j ∈ L. To
see this, observe first that for every j ≤ l, the s+ j observation implies that
βj + γj = 1. This means that for every j ≤ l, βj 6= 0 or γj 6= 0 (this also
implies that either j ∈ J or j ∈ L). If for some j both βj 6= 0 and γj 6= 0,
we will have |K| > l, a contradiction. Hence for every j ≤ l either βj 6= 0 or
γj 6= 0, but not both. (In other words, J = Lc.) This also implies that the
non-zero coeﬃcient out of {βj, γj} has to be 1.
Thus the cardinality ofK is precisely l, and the coeﬃcients {βj, γj} define
a subset of {S1, ...Sl}: if βj = 1 and γj = 0, i.e., j ∈ J , Sj is included in the
subset, and if βj = 0 and γj = 1, i.e., j /∈ J , Sj is not included in the subset.
That this subset {Sj}j∈J constitutes a partition of S follows from the first s
observations as above.
To conclude the proof, it remains to observe that the construction of the
variables (Xj)j≤l, (Zj)j≤l, and Y can be done in polynomial time in the size
of the input. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2:
We first show that NON-PARAMETRIC REGRESSION is in NP. To this
end, it suﬃces to show that, for any given set of attributes E ⊂ A with |E| =
k, one may find in polynomial time (with respect to n×(m+1)) whether there
exists a function g : RE → R such that MSE(E, g) ≤ r. Let there be given
such a set E. Restrict attention to the columns corresponding to E and to Y .
Consider these columns, together with Y as a new matrixX 0 of size n×(|E|+
1). Sort the rows in X 0 lexicographically by the columns corresponding to E.
Observe that, if there are no two identical vectors (xij)j∈E (for diﬀerent i’s in
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C), there exists a function g : RE → R such thatMSE(E, g) = 0. Generally,
MSE(E, g) will be minimized when, for every vector (xij)j∈E ∈ RE that
appears in the matrix corresponding to C ×E, g((xij)j∈E) will be set to the
average of (yl) over all l ∈ C with (xlj)j∈E = (xij)j∈E. That is, for every
selection of values of the predicting variables, the sum of squared errors is
minimized if we choose the average value (of the predicted variable) for this
selection, and this selection is done separately for every vector of values of
the predicting variables. It only remains to check whether this optimal choice
of g yields a value for MSE(E, g) that exceeds r or not.
We now turn to show that NON-PARAMETRIC REGRESSION is in
NP-Complete. We use a reduction of the following problem, which is known
to be NP-Complete (see Gary and Johnson (1979)):
Problem COVER: Given a natural number p, a set of subsets of S ≡
{1, ..., p}, S = {S1, ..., Sq}, and a natural number t ≤ q, are there t subsets
in S whose union contains S?
(That is, are there indices 1 ≤ j1 ≤ ... ≤ jt ≤ q such that
S
l≤t Sjl = S ?)
Let there be given an instance of COVER: a natural number p, a set of
subsets of S ≡ {1, ..., p}, S = {S1, ..., Sq}, and a natural number t. Define
n = p+ 1, m = q, and k = t. Define (xij)i≤n,j≤m and (yi)i≤n as follows. For
i ≤ p, and j ≤ m = q, set xij = 1 if i ∈ Sj and xij = 0 otherwise. For i ≤ n,
set yi = 1. For all j ≤ m, let xnj = 0. Finally, set yn = 0.
We claim that there is a predictor for Y , (E, g), with |E| = k and
MSE(E, g) = 0 iﬀ there are k = t subsets in S that cover S. Indeed,
there exists a predictor for Y , (E, g), with |E| = k and MSE(E, g) = 0 iﬀ
there are k columns out of the m columns in the matrix, such that no row
in the matrix, restricted to these columns, consists of zeroes alone. (Observe
that the first p observations of Y are 1. Thus the only problem in defining
g to obtain a perfect match MSE(E, g) = 0 might occur if some of these
vectors, restricted to the these k columns, is equal to the last vector, which
consists of zeroes for the predicting variables and zero also for Y .) And this
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holds iﬀ there are k sets in S = {S1, ..., Sq} that cover S.
Finally, observe that the construction is polynomial.¤
Proof of Theorem 3:
That INDUCTION is in NP is simple to verify: given a suggested rule
(E,ϕ), one may calculate θ(E,ϕ) in linear time in the size of the sub-matrix
C×E (which is bounded by the size of the input, |C×A|). That INDUCTION
is NP-Complete may be proven by a reduction of the satisfiability problem:32
Problem SATISFIABILITY: Given a Boolean function f in Conjunc-
tive Normal Form in the variables y1, ..., yp, is there an assignment of values
({0, 1}) to the variables for which f = 1?
Let there be given the function f =
Q
i≤q fi where each factor fi is the
summation of variables yj and their negations yj. (The variables are Boolean,
summation means disjunction, multiplication means conjunction, and bar
denotes logical negation.) Let n = q andm = p. For each factor fi, i ≤ q = n,
let there be a case i. For each variable yj, j ≤ p = m, let there be an attribute
j. Define xij as follows:
If yj appears in fi, let xij = 0;
If yj appears in fi, let xij = 1;
Otherwise, let xij = 0.5.
We claim that there exists a valued rule (E,ϕ) with |E| = k = n such
that θ(E,ϕ) ≥ r = 1 iﬀ f is satisfiable by some assignment of values to the
variables y1, ..., yp. Observe that every rule (E,ϕ) with |E| = n defines an
assignment of values (0 or 1) to the variables (yj)j≤p, and vice versa. We
claim that every rule (E,ϕ) with |E| = n obtains the value θ(E,ϕ) = 1
iﬀ the corresponding assignment satisfies f . To see this, let (E,ϕ) be a
rule with |E| = n. Note that θ(E,ϕ) = 1 iﬀ for every case i we have
32SATISFIABILITY is the first problem that was proven to be NP-Complete. This was
done directly, whereas proofs of NP-Completeness of other problems is typically done by
reduction of SATISFIABILITY to these problems (often via other problems). See Gary
and Johnson (1979) for definitions and more details.
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θ((E,ϕ), i) = 1, which holds iﬀ for every case i there exists an attribute j
such that (xij − ϕ(j))2 = 1, that is, xij = 1− ϕ(j). By construction of the
matrix X, xij = 1−ϕ(j) iﬀ (i) yj appears in fi, and ϕ(j) = yj = 1, or (ii) yj
appears in fi and ϕ(j) = yj = 0. (Observe that, if neither yj nor yj appear
in fi, (xij − ϕ(j))2 = 0.25.) In other words, xij = 1 − ϕ(j) iﬀ the variable
yj (or its negation) satisfies the factor fi. It follows that θ(E,ϕ) = 1 iﬀ the
assignment defined by ϕ satisfies f . Observing that the construction above
can be performed in polynomial time, the proof is complete.¤
Proof of Proposition 4:
It is easy to see that SIMPLE INDUCTION is in NP. To show that
SIMPLE INDUCTION is NP-Complete, we use a reduction of COVER again.
Given and instance of COVER, n, S = {S1, ..., Sq}, and t, define n = p,
m = q, and k = t. Thus each member of S corresponds to a case i ∈ C,
and each subset Sj ∈ S — to an attribute j ∈ A. Let xij = 1 if i /∈ Sj and
xij = 0 if i ∈ Sj. We argue that there is a rule E ⊂ A such that |E| ≤ k and
θ(E) ≥ 1 iﬀ there are k subsets {Sjl}l≤k whose union covers S. Indeed, such
a rule exists iﬀ there is a set E of k attributes {jl}l≤k such that, for every i,
θ(E, i) = 1. This holds iﬀ, for every i there exists an attribute jl ∈ E such
that xijl = 0. And this holds iﬀ for each member of S there is at least one of
the k sets {Sjl}l≤k to which it belongs.
Finally, observe that the construction of the matrix X is polynomial in
the size of the data.¤
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8 Appendix B: Computational Complexity
A problem can be thought of as a set of legitimate inputs, and a correspon-
dence from it into a set of legitimate outputs. For instance, consider the
problem “Given a graph, and two nodes in it, s and t, find a minimal path
from s to t”. An input would be a graph and two nodes in it. These are as-
sumed to be appropriately encoded into finite strings over a given alphabet.
The corresponding encoding of a shortest path between the two nodes would
be an appropriate output.
An algorithm, in the intuitive sense, is a method of solution that speci-
fies what the solver should do at each stage. Church’s thesismaintains that
algorithms are those methods of solution that can be implemented by Tur-
ing machines. It is neither a theorem nor a conjecture, because the term
“algorithm” has no formal definition. In fact, Church’s thesis may be viewed
as defining an “algorithm” to be a Turing machine. It has been proved that
Turing machines are equivalent, in terms of the computational tasks they can
perform, to various other computational models. In particular, a PASCAL
(or BASIC) program run on a modern computer with an unbounded hard
disk is also equivalent to a Turing machine and can therefore be viewed as a
definition of an “algorithm”.
It is convenient to restrict attention toYES/NO problems. Such prob-
lems are formally defined as subsets of the legitimate inputs, interpreted as
the inputs for which the answer is YES. Many problems naturally define
corresponding YES/NO problems. For instance, the previous problem may
be represented as “Given a graph, two nodes in it s and t, and a number
k, is there a path of length k between s and t in the graph?” It is usually
the case that if one can solve all such YES/NO problems, one can solve the
corresponding optimization problem. For example, an algorithm that can
solve the YES/NO problem above for any given k can find the minimal k
for which the answer is YES. Moreover, such an algorithm will typically also
find a path that is no longer than the specified k.
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Much of the literature on computational complexity focuses on time
complexity: how many operations will an algorithm need to perform in
order to obtain the solution and halt. It is customary to count operations
of reading and writing numbers, as well as logical and algebraic operations
on numbers as taking a single unit of time each. Taking into account the
amount of time these operations actually take (for instance, the number of
actual operations needed to add two numbers of, say, 10 digits) typically
yields qualitatively similar results.
The literature focuses on asymptotic analysis: how does the number of
operations grow with the size of the input. It is customary to conductworst-
case analysis, though attention is also given to average-case performance.
Obviously, the latter requires some assumptions on the distribution of inputs,
whereas worst-case analysis is free from distributional assumptions. Hence
the complexity of an algorithm is generally defined as the order of magnitude
of the number of operations it needs to perform, in the worst case, to obtain
a solution, as a function of the input size. A problem is polynomial (or,
“of polynomial complexity”) if there exists an algorithm that always solves
it correctly within a number of operations that is bounded by a polynomial
of the input size. A problem is exponential if all the algorithms that solve
it may require a number of operations that is exponential in the size of the
input.
Polynomial problems are generally considered relatively “easy”, even though
they may still be hard to solve in practice, if the coeﬃcients and/or the de-
gree of the bounding polynomial are high. By contrast, exponential problems
become intractable even for inputs of moderate sizes. To prove that a prob-
lem is polynomial, one typically points to a polynomial algorithm that solves
it. Proving that a YES/NO problem is exponential, however, is a very hard
task, because it is generally hard to show that there does not exist an algo-
rithm that solves the problem in a number of steps that is, say, O(n17) or
even O(2
√
n).
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A non-deterministic Turing machine is a Turing machine that allows
multiple computations for a given input. These computations can be thought
of as paths in a tree, in which each node is a step in a computation, and the
depth of the tree measures the time it takes the machine to reach a solution.
A non-deterministic Turing machine can be loosely compared to a parallel
processing modern computer with an unbounded number of processors. It is
assumed that these processors can work simultaneously, and, should one of
them find a solution, the machine halts. Consider, for instance, the Hamil-
tonian path problem: given a graph, is there a path that visits each node
precisely once? A straightforward algorithm for this problem would be ex-
ponential: given n nodes, one needs to check all the n! permutations to see
if any of them defines a path in the graph. A non-deterministic Turing ma-
chine can solve this problem in linear time. Roughly, one can imagine that
n! processors work on this problem in parallel, each checking a diﬀerent per-
mutation. Each processor will therefore need no more than O(n) operations.
In a sense, the diﬃculty of the Hamiltonian path problem arises from the
multitude of possible solutions, and not from the inherent complexity of each
of them.
The class NP is the class of all YES/NO problems that can be solved
in Polynomial time by a Non-deterministic Turing machine. Equivalently,
it can be defined as the class of YES/NO problems for which the validity of
a suggested solution can be verified in polynomial time (by a regular, deter-
ministic algorithm). The class of problems that can be solved in polynomial
time (by a deterministic Turing machine) is denoted P and it is obviously a
subset of NP. Whether P=NP is considered to be the most important open
problem in computer science. While the common belief is that the answer is
negative, there is no proof of this fact.
A problem A is NP-Hard if the following statement is true (“the con-
ditional solution property”): if there were a polynomial algorithm for A,
there would be a polynomial algorithm for any problem B in NP. There may
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be many ways in which such a conditional statement can be proved. For
instance, one may show that using the polynomial algorithm for A a poly-
nomial number of times would result in an algorithm for B. Alternatively,
one may show a polynomial algorithm that translates an input for B to an
input for A, in such a way that the B-answer on its input is YES iﬀ so is the
A-answer of its own input. In this case we say that B is reduced to A.
A problem is NP-Complete if it is in NP, and any other problem in NP
can be reduced to it. It was shown that the SATISFIABILITY problem
(whether a Boolean expression is not identically zero) is such a problem
by a direct construction. The latter means that, for every NP problem B,
there exists an algorithm that accepts an input for B, z, and generates in
polynomial time a Boolean expression that can be satisfied iﬀ the B-answer
on z is YES. With the help of one problem that is known to be NP-Complete
(NPC), one may show that other problems, to which the NPC problem can
be reduced, are also NPC. Indeed, it has been shown that many combinatorial
problems are NPC.
An NPC problem is NP-Hard, but the converse is not necessarily true.
First, NP-Hard problems need not be in NP themselves, and they may not
be YES/NO problems. Second, NPC problems are also defined by a partic-
ular way in which the conditional solution property is proved, namely, by
reduction.
There are by now hundreds of problems that are known to be NPC.
Had we known one polynomial algorithm for one of them, we would have
a polynomial algorithm for each problem in NP. As mentioned above, it is
believed that no such algorithm exists.
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